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Introduction
Alberto Vanzo
University of Warwick
The papers collected in this special issue of Perspectives on Science discuss the
roles and notions of experience in the works of a range of early modern nat-
ural philosophers and physicians, including Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon,
the Dutch atomist David Gorlaeus, William Harvey, and Christian Wolff.
There are three reasons for considering medicine in connection with
natural philosophy when studying early modern views on experience. First,
inﬂuential discussions of experience since antiquity, including those of
Aristotle (e.g., Metaphysics, 981 a 9–21) and his authoritative medieval
commentators (Agrimi and Crisciani 1990, p. 24), make reference to med-
icine and employ medical examples. Second, early modern vocabulary re-
lating to experience contains several terms and distinctions that emerged
in medical circles following the recovery of ancient medical texts and then
entered philosophical contexts. They include “observation,” “phenome-
non,” and the contrast between ﬁrst-hand and vicarious observation, autop-
sia and historia (Pomata 2011a, pp. 23–4; Pomata 2011b, pp. 65, 69).
Third, looking at medical writings allows scholars to weaken or correct
a number of general claims on the transformations of the notion of expe-
rience in the early modern period. Consider two examples.
The ﬁrst is the shift from experiential to experimental empiricism
(Koyré 1953, p. 222). It is often stated that the early modern period wit-
nessed a shift from the reliance on mere experience to the reliance on exper-
iment (e.g., Henry 2008, p. 34). Those who follow this narrative
acknowledge that some experiments were performed in the late antiquity
and Middle Ages. However, they typically add that the signiﬁcance of
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experimentation only started to be acknowledged in the seventeenth century,
ﬁrst within mixed mathematics and then more generally (Dear 1995, 2006;
Garber 2002). A recent study of sixteenth-century medical texts has shown
that this reconstruction of the emergence of experimentation is incorrect
(Ragland, unpublished). Decades before experimentation rose to prominence
within mixed mathematics, anatomists were performing experimental trials,
recognized their signiﬁcance, and regarded them as being capable of proving
or disproving general claims.
The second example concerns a related, but more encompassing narra-
tive that identiﬁes a shift from a historical to an autoptic notion (Baroncini
1992) or, as Peter Dear (1995, p. 21) puts it, from a pre-modern to a modern
notion of experience.1 According to the historical, pre-modern notion, ex-
perience is a body of self-evident, ordinary, commonly accepted knowledge
of what happens “always or for the most part” (Judson 1991, pp. 82–9).
Experience in this pre-modern sense is referred to in the singular form, as
an experientia longa, formed over an extended period of time from the ac-
cumulation of numerous perceptual events in memory. It can be appre-
hended vicariously, through books and oral reports, and it can be relied
upon without ﬁrst-person veriﬁcation (autopsia), in virtue of its being gen-
erally accepted. It does not typically serve as a testing ground for theories
and hypotheses, but rather, as the basis for deriving natural-philosophical
principles that are the starting point of scientia. By contrast, the modern
notion of experience is of a singular event personally witnessed in a speciﬁc
place and time, perhaps brought about as a result of experiments, and
which establishes (or concurs to establish) matters of fact that can be used
to infer, conﬁrm, or refute theories and hypotheses. It is tempting to sup-
pose, and it is sometimes claimed, that the pre-modern, historical notion
of experience was distinctive of the Aristotelians, whereas the modern,
autoptic notion was peculiar to the novatores.
A survey of medical texts is sufﬁcient to disprove this supposition and to
rule out any sharp contrast between Aristotelian and modern attitudes to-
ward experience. On the one hand, conservative Aristotelian anatomists like
Laurentius acknowledged the importance of ﬁrst-person, autoptic experi-
ence (Wear 1983, pp. 227–30). On the other hand, novatores like Michel
de Montaigne and Francis Bacon employed a rather traditional notion of
experience, as being built slowly in the course of time, as the basis of their
views on the preservation of health. However, they emphasized the personal
dimension of this process, combining aspects of the historical and autoptic
notions of experience (Pender 2006). More generally, an understanding of
1. What Dear calls the pre-modern notion is the prevailing notion of experience in
Aristotle’s writings (Le Blond, 1973, pp. 267–8).
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experience as slowly accumulated expertise was important for early modern
physicians of all stripes, including learned and popular practitioners,
Galenists and anti-Galenists (see e.g., Bianchi 2002; Goldberg 2016 [this
issue]).
Turning from medicine to natural philosophy, several recent studies
conﬁrm that it would be wrong to draw a clear-cut distinction between
the notions of experience of traditional and innovative authors. Aristotelian
philosophers are often characterized as relying at most on “bookish” experi-
ence, based on endoxa, textual sources, and thought experiments, as opposed
to the moderns’ emphasis on ﬁrst-hand, sensory experience (Schmitt 1967,
p. 358; Reif 1969; Murdoch 1982; Grant 2002). However, as regards the
roles of experience, Aristotelian naturalists and meteorologists have been
found to rely largely on direct observation as the basis for their claims
(Ogilvie 2006, pp. 19–22; Martin 2011, pp. 1–2). As regards notions of
experience, there were signiﬁcant disagreements among Aristotelians on
the relation of experience to perception and the intellect and on the role
of experience in the acquisition of scientiﬁc knowledge.2 Moving from the
Aristotelians to the novatores, a traditional notion of experientia longa that
derives from numerous perceptual episodes can be found in the works of
Campanella (Ponzio 2004, p. 183), Hobbes ([1651] 1839, p. 6), Descartes
and Pascal (Dear 1990, p. 677), among others. As for Galileo, despite some
historians’ eagerness to crown him as the father of modern science, his
notions and uses of experience have been found to reveal a complex combi-
nation of tradition and innovation (see e.g., Baroncini 1992, pp. 63–101;
Dawes 2016 [this issue]).
Recent research does not only invite us to be cautious about general
claims of large-scale conceptual change and sharp distinctions between
old and new philosophies. It also reminds us that any claims about the
transformation or evolution of early modern understandings of experience
can only be established on the basis of a broad range of detailed case
studies. The six essays gathered in this issue extend the evidential basis
on which we can rely to identify trends, changes and continuities in the
roles and notions of experience in the period of the Scientiﬁc Revolution (see
also Sargent 1989; Burnett 1999; Fattori 2000, pp. 208–16; Fattori 2002;
Stabile 2002; Klestinec 2010). Besides contributing to the exegesis of a
diverse range of authors, the essays shed light on two broad aspects of
the roles that early modern authors assigned to experience: the longstand-
ing inﬂuence of traditional views and the emergence of early modern exper-
imental philosophy.
2. See Heßbrüggen-Walter (2013, 2014) and Spinosa’s (2002) distinction between
Thomist and Ockhamist notions of experience.
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Craig Martin’s paper surveys Renaissance and early modern uses of the
aeolipile to explain the generation of winds. The aeolipile is a metal water
container with one or two small openings. Once it is warmed up, jets of
steam and air shoot forth from the openings, creating lateral wind-like cur-
rents. This is neither the kind of familiar, everyday experience to which tra-
ditional philosophers used to refer to, nor a contrived test that could decide
among competing theories or explanations. Instead, the meaning given to
this experience was largely determined by a broad set of assumptions, in-
cluding deﬁnitions and theories of wind, air and its weight, rarefaction
and condensation, and the different ways in which the aeolipile was thought
to map onto natural phenomena (for instance, does the entire atmosphere act
as a single aeolipile, or do hills and clouds create numerous natural aeoli-
piles?) Experiences with the aeolipile were made to ﬁt with a broad range
of theories in ways that do not map onto familiar distinctions between em-
piricists and rationalists or Aristotelians and their critics.
Helen Hattab’s paper reconstructs the theory of universals of an oppo-
nent of Aristotelian orthodoxy, the Dutch atomist David Gorlaeus, and
discusses his puzzling stance on the role of experience in the attainment
of general notions. Like Hobbes and others, Gorlaeus holds that the mind
can attain scientiﬁc knowledge through the orderly arrangement of general
notions, which derive from experience. Objects do not provide those no-
tions, but only sensory, image-like individual representations. One would
expect Gorlaeus to explain what psychological processes generate general
notions from experience and to emphasize the importance of observations
and experiments as the basis of cognition. Not only does he refrain from
explaining this, but his arguments against universals and intelligible
species appear to bar any possibility of forming general notions.
Hattab solves this difﬁculty by proposing that Gorlaeus, like Suárez,
rejects universals in re, but allows for universals in intellectu and holds that our
sensible representations “come with built-in similarities among the sensible
qualities” of individuals. Our intellect picks out such mind-independent
similarities and relies on them to form universals. Hattab’s interpretative
strategy involves ascribing a limited appropriation of Aristotelian doctrines
to an anti-Aristotelian. This entails that, with regard to the role of experience
in the attainment of general notions, Aristotelian views persisted among anti-
Aristotelians and divisions between the two camps were not as sharp as one
may believe.
Turning from natural philosophy to medicine, more speciﬁcally to
anatomy, William Harvey has been often portrayed as an exemplar of
the attitudes of the novatores: the inventor of an observational epistemology
that renounced the search for causes and advocated the search for purely
factual knowledge (French 1994). Benjamin Goldberg’s essay shows that
258 Introduction
Harvey’s understanding of experientia and of its role within anatomy is
strongly indebted to traditional views. According to Harvey, experientia de-
rives from an extensive training aimed at building up a repertoire of obser-
vations, at developing one’s manual abilities, and at teaching a speciﬁc way
of seeing, a skill in pattern recognition. This is the basis for judgments on
the ends or functions of bodily parts. Harvey regards ﬁrst-hand observation,
its interaction with reasoning and manual skill, the compilation of historiae
anatomicae and the pursuit of comparative anatomy as means to the end
of identifying ﬁnal causes. This shows that Harvey was not indifferent to
causal knowledge and did not invent a purely observational epistemology.
His mindset and his understanding of the role of experience were deeply
informed by Aristotelian and Galenic assumptions.
A central development for the transformation of the notion of experi-
ence is the rise of experimental philosophy in England during the 1660s.
The emphasis of experimental philosophers on experience in the new, au-
toptic sense, as opposed to what Dear calls the pre-modern notion, has
been well documented (e.g., Anstey and Vanzo forthcoming). The essays
in this collection focus on two unresolved issues concerning experimental
philosophy. The ﬁrst issue concerns the methodology of experiment,
which was developed by Francis Bacon, the “Patriark of Experimental
Philosophy” (Power 1664, p. 82). Although, as was noted above, exper-
imental trials were performed in antiquity, the Middle Ages, and Renais-
sance, it is only in the works of Bacon that we ﬁnd an articulate
methodology for the performance of experiments. Dana Jalobeanu’s paper
discusses the relation between this methodology and Bacon’s notion of
experientia literata. The second issue concerns the geographical and chrono-
logical reach of the experimental philosophy movement. This is tackled in
Gregory Dawes’ and Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero’s essays on Galileo
and Wolff.
Scholars have often been puzzled by the seemingly contradictory as-
pects of Bacon’s notion of experientia literata and by its eight modes, which
are enumerated in De augmentis scientiarum (Bacon 1857–1874, vol. 4,
pp. 413–21). Jalobeanu’s paper interprets them as attempts to formalize
the patterns of “good and exact inquiry,” that Bacon follows in his exper-
imental series, and to generalize them into a methodology of experimenta-
tion. Experimental series are methodically organized recordings of
experiments. These may be grouped cursorily, on the basis of their common
topic, or systematically, in virtue of their role within a structured research
program. The more systematic series of experiments exemplify procedures
like the controlled variation of parameters, generalization, analogical think-
ing and modeling, which are the modes of literate experience of the De
augmentis.
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Experimental series provide the organizing principle of Bacon’s natural
histories. They perform a heuristic and pedagogical role, for they direct
experimental practice and teach the neophyte how to become a Baconian
experimenter. They provide the model for the experimental natural histo-
ries of Robert Boyle and the early Royal Society and they are one of Bacon’s
main contributions to the emergence of experimental philosophy.
Dawes’ paper discusses what role experience plays in Galileo’s preferred
style of natural-philosophical reasoning, in order to establish if Galileo can
be classiﬁed as an experimental philosopher. According to Dawes, Galileo
favors a non-syllogistic, geometrical style of demonstrative reasoning. In
this context, the primary role that Galileo assigns to experience lies in
establishing geometrical principles and their applicability to the world.
This may seem similar to the experimentalists’ view that natural philoso-
phers must start by gathering empirical information which will eventually
allow them to establish principles. However, Galileo regards the establish-
ment of principles on the basis of experience as a prelude to geometrical
demonstration. It is the latter that occupies center stage and possesses the
probative force that makes natural philosophy a scientia, a demonstrative
science in the traditional sense. Galileo’s preferred style of reasoning, un-
like that of experimental philosophers, does not mainly focus on experi-
ence, but on the mathematical certainty of demonstrations. Dawes
concludes that Galileo’s natural philosophy cannot be assimilated to exper-
imental (or speculative) natural philosophy.
Turning from seventeenth-century Italy to early eighteenth-century
Germany, recent studies have highlighted the empiricist aspects of Christian
Wolff’s epistemology (e.g., Paccioni 2004) and have identiﬁed afﬁnities be-
tween his natural philosophical methodology and the views of experimental
philosophers (Vanzo forthcoming). Favaretti Camposampiero’s essay dis-
cusses whether Wolff’s afﬁnities with experimental philosophers extend
to his views on medicine. Wolff follows experimental philosophers in stres-
sing the importance of autoptic experience for establishing the matters of
fact that justify medical claims. Yet, he opposes the anti-hypothetical rhet-
oric of experimental philosophers and physicians. In his view, hypotheses
play an indispensable heuristic role and they are used as premises in medical
reasoning. Other premises are borrowed from more basic parts of the system
of the sciences, such as anatomy, chemistry, and teleology (the part of phys-
ics that studies natural ends). Central concepts of medicine, like the concept
of symptom, derive their heuristic value from assumptions on causality that
pertain to metaphysics. Wolff’s defense of the usefulness of hypotheses and
his emphasis on the reliance of medicine on disciplines like teleology
and metaphysics are foreign to the outlook of experimental philosophers
and complement his emphasis on autoptic experience. As in the cases of
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Gorlaeus and Harvey, so too in Wolff’s philosophy received notions of ex-
perience are combined with original views.
References
Agrimi, Jole, and Chiara Crisciani. 1990. “Per una ricerca su Experimentum -
Experimenta: Riﬂessione epistemologica e tradizione medica (secoli XIII–
XV).” Pp. 9–49 in Presenza del lessico latino nelle lingue contemporanee: Ciclo
di lezioni tenute all’Università di Macerata nell’a.a. 1987/88. Edited by
Pietro Janni and Innocenzo Mazzini. Macerata: Università degli Studi.
Anstey, Peter R., and Alberto Vanzo. Forthcoming. “Early Modern Exper-
imental Philosophy.” In A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Edited
by Justin Sytsma and Wesley Buckwalter. London: Blackwell.
Bacon, Francis. 1857–1874. The Works of Francis Bacon. Edited by James
Spedding, Robert L. Ellis, and Douglas D. Heath. London: Longman.
Baroncini, Gabriele. 1992. Forme di esperienza e rivoluzione scientiﬁca. Florence:
Olschki.
Bianchi, Massimo Luigi. 2002. “Il tema dell’esperienza in Paracelso.”
Pp. 199–216 in Experientia: X Colloquio Internazionale. Roma, 4–6 gennaio
2001. Edited by Marco Veneziani. Florence: Olschki.
Burnett, D. Graham. 1999. “The Cosmogonic Experiments of Robert
Fludd: A Translation with Introduction and Commentary.” Ambix 46:
113–170.
Dawes, Gregory. 2016. “Experiment, Speculation, and Galileo’s Scientiﬁc
Reasoning.” Perspectives on Science 24 (2): [this issue]
Dear, Peter. 1990. “Miracles, Experiments, and the Ordinary Course of
Nature.” Isis 81: 663–683.
Dear, Peter. 1995. Discipline & Experience: The Mathematical Way in the
Scientiﬁc Revolution. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press.
Dear, Peter. 2006. “The Meanings of Experience.” Pp. 106–131 in The
Cambridge History of Science, vol. 3: Early Modern Science. Edited by Katharine
Park and Lorraine Daston. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fattori, Marta. 2000. Linguaggio e ﬁlosoﬁa nel Seicento europeo. Florence:
Olschki.
Fattori, Marta. 2002. “Experientia - experimentum: Un confronto tra il corpus
latino e inglese di Francis Bacon.” Pp. 243–258 in Experientia: X
Colloquio Internazionale. Roma, 4–6 gennaio 2001. Edited byMarcoVeneziani.
Florence: Olschki.
French, Roger. 1994. William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Garber, Daniel. 2002. “Prospettive storiche: l’aristotelismo e le nuove ﬁlosoﬁe.”
Pp. 17–33 in Storia della scienza, vol. 5: La rivoluzione scientiﬁca. Rome:
Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana.
261Perspectives on Science
Goldberg, Benjamin. 2016. “William Harvey on Anatomy and Experi-
ence.” Perspectives on Science 24 (2): [this issue]
Grant, Edward. 2002. “Medieval Natural Philosophy: Empiricism without
Observation.” Pp. 141–168 in The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philos-
ophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century. Edited by Cees Leijenhorst,
Christoph Lüthy, and Johannes M. M. H. Thijssen. Leiden: Brill.
Henry, John. 2008. The Scientiﬁc Revolution and the Origins of Modern
Science, 3rd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Heßbrüggen-Walter, Stefan. 2013. “Scientiﬁc Knowledge and the Meta-
physics of Experience: The Debate in Early Modern Aristotelianism.”
Studia Neoaristotelica 10: 134–156.
Heßbrüggen-Walter, Stefan. 2014. “Problems with Rhubarb: Accommo-
dating Experience in Aristotelian Theories of Science.” Early Science and
Medicine 19: 317–340.
Hobbes, Thomas. [1651] 1839. Leviathan: Or the Matter, Form, and Power
of a Commonwealth. Vol. 3 of The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of
Malmesbury. Edited by William Molesworth. London: Bohn.
Judson, Lindsay. 1991. “Chance and ‘Always or For the Most Part’ in
Aristotle.” Pp. 73–99 in Aristotle’s Physics: A Collection of Essays. Edited
by Lindsay Judson. Oxford: Clarendon.
Klestinec, Cynthia. 2010. “Practical Experience in Anatomy.” Pp. 33–57
in The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism
in Early Modern Science. Edited by Charles T. Wolfe and Ofer Gal.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Koyré, Alexandre. 1953. “An Experiment in Measurement.” Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Society 97: 222–237.
Le Blond, Jean Marie. 1973. Logique et méthode chez Aristote: Étude sur
la recherche des principes dans la physique aristotélicienne, 3rd edition. Paris:
Vrin.
Martin, Craig. 2011. Renaissance Meteorology: Pomponazzi to Descartes. Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Murdoch, John. 1982. “The Analytic Character of Late Medieval Learning:
Natural Philosophy without Nature.” Pp. 171–213 in Approaches to
Nature in the Middle Ages: Papers of the Tenth Annual Conference of the Cen-
ter for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies. Edited by Lawrence D.
Roberts. Binghamton, NY: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance
Studies.
Ogilvie, Brian W. 2006. The Science of Describing: Natural History in Renais-
sance Europe. Chicago, Ill: Chicago University Press.
Paccioni, Jean-Paul. 2004. “Wolff est il ‘le vrai inventeur de la psychologie
rationnelle’? L’expérience, l’existence actuelle et la rationalité dans le
projet wolfﬁen de psychologie.” Pp. 75–97 in Die Psychologie Christian
262 Introduction
Wolffs: Systematische und historische Untersuchungen. Edited by Olivier-
Pierre Rudolph and Jean-François Goubet. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Pender, Stephen. 2006. “Examples and Experience: On the Uncertainty of
Medicine.” British Journal for the History of Science 39: 1–28.
Pomata, Gianna. 2011a. “A Word of Empirics: The Ancient Concept
of Observation and its Recovery in Early Modern Medicine.” Annals
of Science 68: 1–25.
Pomata, Gianna. 2011b. “Observation Rising: Birth of an Epistemic Genre,
1500–1650.” Pp. 45–80 in Histories of Scientiﬁc Observation. Edited by
Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Ponzio, Paolo. 2004. “The Articulation of the Idea of Experience in the
16th and 17th Centuries.” Quaestio 4: 175–195.
Power, Henry. 1664. Experimental Philosophy. London.
Ragland, Evan. “Making Trials in Sixteenth Century Medicine.” Unpub-
lished manuscript.
Reif, Patricia. 1969. “The Textbook Tradition in Natural Philosophy,
1600–1650.” Journal of the History of Ideas 30: 17–32.
Sargent, Rose-Mary. 1989. “Scientiﬁc Experiment and Legal Expertise:
The Way of Experience in Seventeenth-Century England.” Studies in
the History and Philosophy of Science 20: 19–45.
Schmitt, Charles B. 1967. “Experimental Evidence for and against the
Void: The Sixteenth-Century Arguments.” Isis 58: 352–366.
Spinosa, Giacinta. 2002. “Empeiria/Experientia: Modelli di ‘prova’ tra
antichità, medioevo ed età cartesiana.” Pp. 77–90 in Experientia: X
Colloquio Internazionale. Roma, 4–6 gennaio 2001. Edited byMarcoVeneziani.
Florence: Olschki.
Stabile, Giorgio. 2002. “Il concetto di esperienza in Galilei e nella scuola
galileiana.” Pp. 217–241 in Experientia: X Colloquio Internazionale. Roma,
4–6 gennaio 2001. Edited by Marco Veneziani. Florence: Olschki.
Vanzo, Alberto. Forthcoming. “Christian Wolff and Experimental Philos-
ophy.” Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 7 (in press).
Wear, Andrew. 1983. “William Harvey and the ‘Way of the Anatomists’.”
History of Science 21: 223–249.
263Perspectives on Science
